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Last week's last-minute fisca l cliff law adds on ly a little innovation to the 112th Congress' meager 
record on energy. The American Taxpayer Rel ief Act of 2012 extends existing tax provisions in 
support of renewable energy, like the production tax credit for wind, that were set to expire at the end 
of 2012; it also reinstates retroact ively a number of provisions that had expired at the end of 2011 . 
There are really only two sorts of innovation on energy tax incentives in the bill : First, there are a few 
new tax credits- for 2- or 3-wheeled alternative fuel vehicles, and for biofuels based on sources like 
algae. Second, more expansive ly and expensively, the scope of the va rious alternative-energy 
production tax credits (including the wind-energy production tax credit) has been expanded to include 
projects merely under construction by the end of 2013, and not already "placed in service" as under 
previous law. 
But mostly, the roster of provisions includes extensions of tax credits for alternative fuel vehicles, 
alternative fue ls includ ing ce llulosic biofuels and biodiesel, energy efficient homes and appliances, 
coal from reserves owned by or held in trust for an Ind ian tribe, and wind energy production, as well 
as enhanced expensing and deprec iation allowances for some property concerned with energy 
production. 
This inability, or political refusal, to innovate, has consequences. Tax "extenders" often turn up in 
leg islation for some obvious reasons: There is no new language to argue over; the language 
presumably had the intended effects the fi rst time; taxpayers and accountants are familiar with the 
structure of the incentives; tax return software need be only minimally revised; and all the enacting 
statute must do is change a date, so no one can sneak any controversial new language in under the 
radar. 
Rejuvenating these exp ired or expiring measures means Congress is not responding to changing 
circumstances. As the American Council for an Energy-Effic ient Economy (ACEEE) has pointed out, 
the credits are tailored to specifi c industries and technolog ies, giving them a leg up against innovative 
new tec hnolog ies or approaches that are not yet covered by the tax code . This conservatism has a 
price, locking in the tax-favored status of large, politically powerful manufacturers, who lobby 
Congress for the extenders. The production tax cred it for wind energy is a good example. For wind-
turbine owners who produce the energy, the production tax credit is a sine qua non for profitability; 
because Siemens and General Electric sell the equipment to these producers, they support the credit 
as keeping their line of business open. Therefore, the existence and level of the credit are not based 
solely on environmental and energy-security concerns, but also on subjective (and fickle) lobbying. 
Tax extenders also continue genuine inequities and problems. lnATRA 2012, a good example is 
probably the extension of the last of the energy-efficient-appliance tax cred it under section 45M of the 
tax code , a credit that is available to appliance manufactu rers. Bloomberg and its publication 
Businessweek have been reporting fo r years on how Whirlpool has pa id no taxes in recent years, 
thanks in part to the credit. Any beneficial effects of the credit are channeled th rough the profits of an 
oligopolic manufacturer, and it's not clear what benefit buyers see from ii , or if they wou ld have been 
interested in energy-efficient appliances regardless of these credits. 
Real problems of inequity seem to arise with cred its that go to homeowners and small businesses. 
Implicated here is Congress's extension of the household-level energy-effic ient existing-home cred it 
under section 25C . The home-building industry has reported significant progress on installations of 
energy-efficient equipment and insu lation into homes, and lobbied Congress to expand the 
incentives . However, shoehorn ing private households' energy-independence and environmental 
conservation efforts into the Internal Revenue Code with the home energy effic iency credits poses 
serious equity and administrative problems 
Equ ity fi rst a recent study for the Congressional Research Service finds that these credits benefit the 
wealthier. Because the credits are not re fundable-they can generally only be used to offset tax 
actually owed by individuals in the year in which the energy-effic ient property was purchased-people 
with lower incomes, who may not owe taxes or who are taxed at lower rates, are not incentivized to 
update their homes. The numbers bear this out, showing that benefit from the credits is heavily 
skewed towa rds higher-income ind ividuals. 
Administrative problems second: the issue here is the possibly high proportion of waste in 
government expense. Beca use the incentives are structured as tax credits , administration and 
enforcement are left up to the IRS , an agency that already must deal with hundreds of provisions and 
has only limited mechanisms to aud it and otherwise test the application of the cred its. 
Form 5695 does not ask for proof of the home in question (and a glance will show that it's 
unappealing ly complicated and lengthy). Although there is comparatively little revenue impact 
(c ertainly less than a hundred million dollars , small compared especially to the levels of med ica re 
fraud in this country), the CRS cites a recent report from an Inspector General at the Treasury 
Department who found indications that fra ud was a strong possibility: 30o/o of credit applicants could 
not be confirmed to be homeowners, and at least 5% of those who claimed the cred it gave no 
ind ication of home ownership at all. 
These extenders don't change the energy picture very much; they also don't fix in the minds of the 
voters or of people in industry that Congress is interested in tak ing big steps to address America's 
energy usage. ATRA 2012 is only rea lly newsworthy for one incentive that Congress neg lected to 
reinstitute: the section 1603 grant program. The grants-in-lieu-of-credits were available to taxpayers 
that might have been eligib le for the production tax credit or the investment tax credit expired for 
projects that were not under construction by the end of 201 1 (although another $15.g billion is 
expected to be paid out as fac ilities are placed in service through 2015). Congressiona l 
investigations and anger over noisy and expensive government-funded failures ensured that no 
extension would be passed; this may be just as well for soothing public indignation, but it doesn't 
speak much for new paths for America's energy future. 
Leave a Reply 







T/1e KBH Energy Center 
blog is a forwn for faculty 
at T/Je University of 
Texas at Austin, leading 
practitioners, lawmakers 
and ot11er experts to 
contribute to l/1e 
discussion of vital law 
and policy debates in t/1e 
areas of energy, 
enviromnental law, and 
international arbitration. 
Blog posts reflect l/1e 
opinions of tile aut/1ors 
and not of Tile University 
of Texas at Austin or tile 
KBH Energy Center. 






natural gas (13) 
endangered species (12) 
oil and gas (10) 
groundwater (8) 
climate change (8) 
court cases (7) 
epa (6) 
regulation (5) 
conservation (5) 
pollution (5) 
